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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this Appeal from 
the Third Judicial District Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(a) (1992). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the District Court correctly determined and apply the 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof in a trial de novo 
and review of an informal adjudicative proceeding involving 
allegations of criminal violations ? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing questions of law, the appellate court uses a 
correctness of error standard. Neiderhauser Builders and Dev. 
Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah App. 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are pertinent to resolution 
of the issues presented on appeal, and are set forth verbatim in 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto: 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-5-107 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-101 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-201 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-17 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. This case involves an action by the 
DABC against Pop Jenks for alleged violations of certain criminal 
provisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. 
Course of Proceedings. The DABC filed a Complaint against 
Pop Jenks and an informal hearing was held before the DABC 
Commission regarding the DABC's Complaint. Pop Jenks filed a 
Petition for Review of the informal adjudicative hearing and a 
trial de novo before the Third Judicial District Court. The 
Third Judicial District Court conducted the trial de novo and 
dismissed the DABC's Complaint against Pop Jenks. The DABC filed 
an appeal of the District Court's decision with the Court of 
Appeals. 
Disposition in District Court. The District Court, 
Honorable David S. Young, dismissed with prejudice the DABC's 
Complaint against Pop Jenks which alleged violation of certain 
criminal provisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, and 
ordered all references to such hearing and conviction before the 
DABC Commission expunged from the records of Pop Jenks within ten 
(10) days from the date of the order. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff/Appellee RAINBOW TROUT, INC., dba POP JENKS, 
is a Utah Corporation and a DABC private club liquor licensee 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 32A-5-101, et seq. (hereinafter 
referred to as "Pop Jenks"). 
2. Defendants/Appellants STATE OF UTAH and the DEPARTMENT 
OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, a duly authorized department of 
the State of Utah, are hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"the DABC". 
3. On December 18, 1991, two (2) undercover agents entered 
"Pop Jenks," a private club located in Park City, Utah. (R. at 
143) . 
4. The agents requested service from a bartender who wore 
a DABC Badge with the name of "Aldis." (R. at 143). 
5. Aldis asked if the agents were members of the club, to 
which they replied they were not. (R. at 143). 
6. Aldis then sought sponsorship for the agents from an 
undisclosed person in the club, who responded that he could not 
sponsor the agents because he was "on duty," but that "Steve is 
in the back room, he will sponsor you." (R. at 143). 
7. "Steve," a co-owner of the club who was not on duty at 
the time, gave the bartender, Aldis, the "ok" sign with his hand 
as a sign of being willing to sponsor the agents. (R. at 143). 
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8. The agents were then served a drink. (R. at 144). 
9. On December 18, 1991, the Utah State Division of 
Narcotics and Liquor Law Enforcement filed a criminal Complaint 
Form with the DABC charging Pop Jenks with a criminal offense. 
(See Exhibit "B" attached hereto). 
10. Based upon the above Complaint Form, the DABC filed a 
Complaint against Pop Jenks on December 23, 1991, alleging 
violations of Section 32A-5-107(5), 32A-5-107(7) and 32A-12-201 
of the Utah Alcoholic Beverage Control Act for selling alcoholic 
beverages to "unsponsored guests" (referred to herein as "the 
Complaint"). (R. at 131). 
11. On March 26, 1992, an informal hearing was held before 
administrative hearing officer Richard R. Golden. The 
administrative hearing officer, by Order dated April 24, 1992, 
found Pop Jenks guilty of violating Utah Code Ann. § 32A-5-107 
and § 32A-12-201, suspended Pop Jenks7 license for five (5) days 
and assessed administrative costs against Pop Jenks in the amount 
of $535.00. (R. at 131). 
12. On May 26, 1993, Pop Jenks filed an Amended Petition 
for Review and Trial De Novo before the Third Judicial District 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15. (R. at 43-45). 
13. On February 15, 1994, a trial was held before the 
Honorable David S. Young. Judge Young, by Judgment dated March 
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15, 1994, dismissed with prejudice the DABC's Complaint against 
Pop Jenks and ordered all reference to the hearing and conviction 
before the DABC Commission expunged from the records of Pop Jenks 
within ten (10) days from the date of the order. (R. at 160). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The District Court correctly applied the "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" burden of proof in its trial de novo and review 
of the DABC's informal adjudicative hearing. 
The DABC Complaint against Pop Jenks alleges violation of 
criminal statutes set forth in the Utah Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Act. Violation of such statutes are considered class A 
and B misdemeanors. Enforcement of such provisions are subject 
to the Utah Criminal Code. Under the Utah Criminal Code, the 
correct burden of proof regarding criminal offenses is "beyond a 
reasonable doubt." 
The District Court review of an informal administrative 
agency determination is required to be a trial de novo. When the 
trial de novo and review involves alleged violations of criminal 
statutes, the correct burden of proof at such trial is "beyond a 
reasonable doubt." This is true regardless of the burden of 
proof required at the informal administrative agency 
adjudication. Administrative hearings are by nature "informal" 
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and are not subject to the technical rules of evidence, procedure 
and burdens of proof to which trial court proceedings are 
subject. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE PROPER 
BURDEN OF PROOF IN ITS TRIAL DE NOVO AND REVIEW OF THE 
DABC'S INFORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING IN THIS CASE IS 
"BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT," 
A. EACH ELEMENT OF A CRIMINAL OFFENSE MUST BE PROVED 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
It is well-established Utah law that each element of a 
criminal offense must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Section 76-1-501 of the Utah Code provides: "A defendant in a 
criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each element 
of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1992). "Offense" is defined 
as "a violation of any penal statute of this state." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-601(6) (1992).x 
In the case at hand, Pop Jenks was charged by the DABC with 
violating Utah Code Ann. § 32A-5-107(5), § 32A-5-107(7) and 
§ 32A-12-201(1) for the alleged unlawful sale or service of 
alcoholic beverages or products. These provisions are considered 
1
 As noted in the DABC's Brief, "[fundamental respect for the liberty of individuals requires a 
stringent burden of proof in any case in which a person faces criminal punishment" and "[t]he 
imposition of this burden upon the prosecution reflects the dire nature of the penalties that can occur 
if guilt is established." DABC Brief at 5. 
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penal statutes and constitute "criminal offenses" as defined by 
the Utah Code.2 Section 32A-12-104 provides that any person who 
violates Title 32A or any commission rules adopted thereunder is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor, unless otherwise provided in the 
Title. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-104 (1991). Section 32A-12-101 
also provides that the criminal provisions of the Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Act are subject to the Utah Criminal Code. 
Section 32A-12-101 provides: 
Chapters 1,2,3 and 4, Title 76, the Utah Criminal Code, 
relating to principles of construction, jurisdiction, 
venue, limitations of actions, multiple prosecutions, 
double jeopardy, burdens of proof, definitions and 
inchoate offenses apply to any criminal offense defined 
in this title, except as otherwise provided. 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-101 (1991) (emphasis added). 
Thus, the charge against Pop Jenks under § 32A-5-107 is 
considered a class B misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment not 
to exceed six (6) months and/or a fine not to exceed $1,000.00. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-12-101, 76-3-204 and 76-3-301 (1992). The 
charge under § 32A-12-201 is considered a class A misdemeanor, 
punishable by imprisonment not to exceed one (1) year and/or a 
fine not to exceed $2,500.00. Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-12-201(2), 
76-3-204 and 76-3-301 (1992). The enforcement of these statutes 
is subject to the provisions of the Utah Criminal Code, including 
2
 Chapter 12 of Title 32A is entitled "criminal offenses." 
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those provisions relating to burdens of proof• Utah Code Ann, 
32A-12-101 (1992). Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501, the proper 
burden of proof to apply to the enforcement of such provisions is 
"beyond a reasonable doubt." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1992). 
B. THE DISTRICT COURTS REVIEW OF THE DABC'S INFORMAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING IS BY TRIAL DE NOVO. 
Pop Jenks petitioned the District Court for judicial review 
of an informal adjudicative proceeding of the DABC pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 (1993). Under Section 63-46b-15, such 
judicial review of a final agency action resulting from informal 
adjudicative proceedings is by "trial de novo." The trial de 
novo is in essence a new trial wherein the trial court gives no 
deference to the administrative finding below. The district 
court is required under Section 63-46b-15 to hold a new trial and 
may not just review the informal record. Cordova v. Blackstock, 
224 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Brinkerhoff v. 
Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 588 (Utah App. 1990). Utah Courts and 
the legislature recognize that there are significant differences 
between trial court proceedings and administrative hearings.3 
The primary purpose of the trial de novo provided under Section 
3
 The technical rules of evidence are not applicable at administrative proceedings. In contrast, all 
pleadings and procedures of court proceedings are governed by such rules and the rules of civil and 
criminal procedure. It is specifically provided at Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15(2)(b) and (3)(b) that the 
trial de novo before the district court is governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
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63-46b-15 is to allow the district courts to consider and remedy 
any deficiencies that might arise by nature of the informalities 
of the agency hearing• Cordova. 224 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18, fn 1 
(citing Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control Comm/n, 681 P.2d 1224, 
1226 (Utah 1984). 
Under Section 63-46b-15, the District Court was required to 
conduct a new trial regarding the criminal offenses alleged in 
the DABC's Complaint against Pop Jenks, including alleged 
violations of Sections 32A-5-107 and 32A-12-201 of the Utah Code. 
At such trial, the District Court was not limited to affirming or 
denying the administrative agency's finding that Pop Jenks 
violated the criminal statutes alleged, nor to upholding or 
reversing the agency's decision to suspend Pop Jenks' liquor 
license. In a trial de novo, the District Court is permitted to 
make its own finding as to Pop Jenks' alleged violation of the 
statutes, and to determine its own punishment or penalty for any 
such violation. Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-17 (1993), the 
District Court, reviewing an informal adjudicative proceeding by 
trial de novo, is entitled to provide judicial relief through the 
award of damages or compensation authorized by statute and to 
order any agency action required by law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-17 (1993). If the District Court found Pop Jenks guilty of 
the charges in the complaint, Pop Jenks could have been guilty of 
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a class A or B misdemeanor and sentenced to a maximum of one (1) 
year in jail, fined up to $2,500.00 and/or had its license 
suspended. With such a result possible at the trial de novo, Pop 
Jenks was entitled to a "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of 
proof, and the District Court was required to apply such a 
burden.4 
C. THE CASES CITED BY THE DABC FAIL TO CONTRADICT THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE CORRECT BURDEN OF 
PROOF IN THE TRIAL DE NOVO IS BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT. 
DABC contends that the burden of proof at the trial de novo 
should have been "a preponderance of the evidence." This 
contention is based upon the case of Walker v. Board of Pardons. 
803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990). Walker involves an appeal from an 
order dismissing a writ of habeas corpus wherein the appellant 
claims his parole was improperly revoked. The Walker opinion 
consists of three paragraphs with very little, if any, meaningful 
analysis of the issues. In dicta, the opinion notes that "[t]he 
burden of proof in a criminal proceeding is beyond a reasonable 
doubt" and that "[i]n an administrative proceeding, it is by a 
preponderance of the evidence." Walker, 803 P.2d at 1241 (citing 
Johns v. Shulsen, 717 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1986)). However, these 
4
 DABC concedes in its Brief that if Pop Jenks had been found guilty of a class B misdemeanor for 
violating the liquor laws, it could have faced up to six (6) months in jail and/or a fine of up to $1,000.00, 
and that "[t]his substantial deprivation of liberty requires the heaviest burden of proof possible." 
DABC Brief at 8. 
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quotes are taken out of context and improperly cite Johns v. 
Shulsen for such a broad-sweeping conclusion. The holding in 
Johns is limited to the conclusion that the burden of proof in a 
parol revocation hearing is by preponderance of the evidence. 
This conclusion should not be applied in the case at hand as the 
facts and circumstances are distinguishable. First, Johns and 
Walker involve the review of parol revocation hearings. Utah 
case law has previously established that parole revocation is of 
a civil, rather than criminal nature, and that such proceedings 
are administrative rather than criminal, since the proceedings 
stem from a clear violation of the rules and regulations imposed 
as a condition of parole. Johns v. Shulsen, 717 P.2d at 1339 
(Utah 1986) (citing Ward v. Smith, 573 P.2d 781, 782 (Utah 1978), 
and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)). In the case 
at hand, the proceedings stem from a violation of state penal 
statutes. In addition, the sanctions for violation of parol are 
remedial in nature rather than punitive. Johns, 717 P.2d at 
1339. In the case at hand, the sanctions for violation of the 
statutes are punitive. Thus, the Johns conclusion that the 
burden of proof in an administrative hearing is by a 
preponderance of the evidence is limited to the facts of that 
case and the type of hearing involved; i.e. a parol revocation 
hearing and the underlying violations alleged. 
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Regardless of the above clarification, the Johns and Walker 
language regarding burden of proof in an administrative hearing 
is irrelevant to the case at hand as this case involves a trial 
de novo before the district court, not an administrative hearing. 
Finally, the case of One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United 
States, 409 U.S. 232, 236 (1971), cited by DABC, also fails to 
sufficiently challenge the District Court's conclusion that the 
requisite burden of proof in the trial de novo is beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Emerald Stones actually supports the District 
Court's conclusion. The proceeding at issue in Emerald Stones 
involved "a separate adjudication brought under the civil 
provisions of the forfeiture laws." The requisite burden of 
proof under such civil forfeiture laws was "preponderance of the 
evidence." The proceeding at issue in the case at hand involves 
"an adjudication brought under criminal statutes of the Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Act of Title 32A." Under Emerald Stones, the 
proper and requisite burden of proof under such criminal statutes 
is "beyond a reasonable doubt." 
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II. THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT POP JENKS WAS NOT GUILTY OF THE 
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
The DABC failed to brief the issue regarding the District 
Court's finding that the DABC did not establish "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" that Pop Jenks was guilty of the criminal 
offenses charged.5 This failure is probably due to the logical 
and practical conclusion that there is no evidence to support the 
contrary/ and that the District Court's conclusion of fact will 
be given great deference by the reviewing court. The issue of 
the burden of proof is dispositive in this case, and if it is 
determined by this Court that the proper burden of proof at the 
trial de novo is "beyond a reasonable doubt," there is sufficient 
evidence in the record to support the District Court's conclusion 
that this burden was not met. 
CONCLUSION 
Pop Jenks was charged by the DABC with violating the 
criminal statutes set forth at Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-12-201 and 
32A-5-107. Pop Jenks was found guilty of violating such statutes 
and had its liquor license revoked based upon such determination 
pursuant to informal adjudicative proceedings. At a trial de 
5
 The issue is raised in its Docketing Statement, however, as issue No. 2 at p. 4. 
6
 Even the administrative official noted in his Order that "the method of guest sponsorship 
described . . . is not illegal, it does present some practical problems for both licensees and investigating 
agencies." UABC Commission Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law dated April 14, 1992 at p. 3. 
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novo, the District Court dismissed the Complaint against Pop 
Jenks finding that there was insufficient evidence to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Pop Jenks violated such criminal 
statutes. 
The District Court could very well have found sufficient 
evidence that Pop Jenks violated the criminal statutes. Under 
power vested in the District Court, Pop Jenks could have been 
found guilty of a class A or B misdemeanor and sentenced up to 
one (1) year in jail, fined up to $2,500.00 and/or had its 
license suspended. On this basis, the District Court correctly 
determined that the required burden of proof at the trial de novo 
in this case was "beyond a reasonable doubt." The District Court 
further correctly determined that the evidence before the Court 
did not sufficiently establish Pop Jenks' was guilty of the 
alleged violations beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Pop Jenks respectfully requests this Court to affirm the 
District Court's ruling dismissing the DABC's Complaint against 
Pop Jenks for alleged criminal violations of the Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Act and expunging Pop Jenks' record of any 
evidence regarding the same. 
DATED this /($ day of August, 1994. 
ALLAN Tl. METOS 
Attorney for Appellee Pop ^ Tenks 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
32A-5-106 ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES 258 
(d) no member of the club or any of its officers 
directors or trustees is under 21 years of age 
and 
(e) one of the purposes for which the corpora 
tion has been organized is for obtaining a license 
from the commission for the storage, sale, ser 
vice, or consumption of liquor 
(3) The Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code shall issue a corporate charter to a private club 
nonprofit corporation or association organized under 
this chapter only upon receipt of an endorsed affida 
vit from the department stating that a true and com 
plete copy of the articles of incorporation have been 
delivered to the department and that the articles 
meet the requirements of the department as estab-
lished by this chapter and the rules of the commis 
sion 
(4) Any persons knowingly incorporating under 
this chapter with the object of pecuniary profit, and 
all persons having possession of any charter issued 
under this section, but revoked by the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code, who refuse upon 
demand to deliver the charter so revoked, are guilty 
of a class B misdemeanor 1991 
32A-5-106. Bond. 
(1) Each private club liquor licensee shall post a 
cash or corporate surety bond in the penal sum of 
$10,000 payable to the department, which the li-
censee has procured and must maintain for so long as 
the licensee continues to operate as a private club 
liquor licensee 
(2) The bond shall be in a form approved by the 
attorney general, conditioned upon the licensee's 
faithful compliance with this title and the rules of the 
commission 
(3) If the $10,000 corporate surety bond is canceled 
due to the licensee's negligence, a $300 reinstatement 
fee may be assessed No part of any cash or corporate 
bond so posted may be withdrawn during the period 
the license is in effect, or while revocation proceed-
ings are pending against the licensee A bond filed by 
a licensee may be forfeited if the license is finally 
revoked 1990 
32A-5-107. Operational restrictions. 
Each corporation or association granted a private 
club liquor license and its employees, officers, manag-
ing agent, and members shall abide by the following 
conditions and requirements Failure to comply may 
result in a suspension or revocation of the license or 
other disciplinary action taken against individual 
employees or management personnel 
(1) Each private club shall hold regular meet-
ings as required by its articles or bylaws and con-
duct its business through regularly elected offi-
cers Within ten days following the election of 
any officer, the department shall be notified in 
writing of the officer's name, address, and office 
to which the officer has been elected, and the 
term of that office 
(2) Each private club may admit members 
only on written application signed by the appli-
cant, following investigation and approval of the 
governing body Admissions shall be recorded in 
the official minutes of a regular meeting of the 
governing body and the application, whether ap 
proved or disapproved, shall be filed as a part of 
the official records of the licensee An applicant 
may not be accorded the privileges of a member 
until a quorum of the governing body has for-
mally voted upon and approved the applicant as 
a member An applicant may not be admitted 
membership until seven days after the appli 
tion is submitted 
(3) Each private club shall maintain a 
current 
and complete membership record showing tK 
date of application of each proposed member th 
member's address, the date of admission follow 
ing application and the date initiation fees arvi 
dues were assessed and paid The record shall 
also show the serial number of the membershi 
card issued to each member A current record 
shall also be kept indicating when members wer* 
dropped or resigned 
(4) Each private club shall establish m the 
club bylaws initial fees and monthly dues, as es-
tablished by commission rules, which are col. 
lected from all members 
/> A5) Each private club may allow guests or visi-
(xxors to use the premises only when previously 
authorized by a member A member is responsi-
ble for all services extended to guests and visi-
tors If the guest or visitor is a member of the 
same fraternal organization as the private club 
liquor licensee, no previous authorization is re-
quired 
(6) Each private club shall limit the issuance 
of visitor cards for a period not to exceed two 
weeks and assess and collect a fee from each visi-
tor of not less than $5 for each two-week period 
the visitor card is issued One dollar of every visi-
tor card fee shall be remitted quarterly to the 
department for the administration of this title A 
current record of the issuance of each card shall 
be maintained and shall contain the name of the 
member sponsoring the visitor 
.• XI) A private club may not sell alcoholic bever-
/•ages to any person other than a member, guest, 
or visitor who holds a valid visitor card issued 
under Subsection (6) 
(8) A person who is under 21 years of age may 
not be a member, officer, director, or trustee of a 
private club 
(9) An employee of a club, while on duty, may 
not consume an alcoholic beverage, be under the 
influence of alcoholic beverages, sponsor a person 
for visitor privileges, or act as a host for a guest 
(10) A visitor to a club may not host more than 
five guests at one time 
(11) Each private club shall maintain an ex-
pense ledger or record showing in detail all ex-
penditures separated by payments for malt or 
brewed beverages, liquor, food, detailed payroll, 
entertainment, rent, utilities, supplies, and all 
other expenditures This record shall be kept in a 
form approved by the department and balanced 
each month Each expenditure shall be supported 
by delivery tickets, invoices, receipted bills, can-
celed checks, petty cash vouchers, or other sus^ 
taming data or memoranda All invoices and re-
ceipted bills for the current calendar or fiscal 
year documenting purchases made by officers of 
the club for the benefit of the club shall also he 
maintained 
(12) Each private club shall maintain a bank 
account that shows all income and expenditures 
as a control on the income and disbursements 
records This account shall be balanced each 
month under the direction of the treasurer or 
other officer of the licensee 
(13) Each private club shall maintain a 
minute book that is posted currently by the sec-
retarv This record shall contain the minutes oi 
on notice that the beverage is an alcoholic bever-
age. The beverage shall bear the label "alcoholic-
beverage" or a manufacturer's label which in 
common usage apprises the general public that 
the beverage contains alcohol. 
(2) Failure to comply with the provisions of Subsec-
tion (1) may result in suspension or revocation of the 
beer wholesaling license or other disciplinary action 
taken against individual employees or management 
persoi nnel of the licensee. 
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PART 1 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
32A-12-101. Utah Criminal Code applicable. 
Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4, Title 76, the Utah Criminal 
Code, relating to principles of construction, jurisdic-
tion, venue, limitations of actions, multiple prosecu-
tions, double jeopardy, burdens of proof, definitions, 
principles of criminal responsibility, punishments, 
and inchoate offenses apply to any criminal offense 
defined in this title, except as otherwise provided. 
1990 
32A-12-102. Special burdens of proof — Infer-
ences and presumptions. 
(1) In any prosecution of an offense defined in this 
title or in any proceeding brought to enforce this title: 
(a) it is not necessary that the state or commis-
sion establish the precise description or quantity 
of the alcoholic beverages or products or the pre-
cise consideration, if any, given or received for 
the alcoholic beverages or products; 
(b) there is an inference, absent proof to the 
contrary, that the alcoholic beverage or product 
in question is intoxicating if the witness de-
scribes it as intoxicating or by a name that is 
commonly applied to an intoxicating alcoholic 
beverage or product; 
(c) if it is alleged that an association or corpo-
ration has violated this title, the fact of the incor-
poration of the association or corporation is pre-
sumed absent proof to the contrary; 
(d) a certificate or report signed or purporting 
to be signed by any state chemist, assistant state 
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chemist, or state crime laboratory chemist, as to 
the analysis or ingredients of any alcoholic bev-
erage or product is prima facie evidence of the 
facts stated in that certificate or report and of the 
authority of the person giving or making the re-
port, and is admissible in evidence without any 
proof of appointment or signature absent proof to 
the contrary; 
(e) a copy of entries made in the records of the 
United States internal revenue collector, certi-
fied by the collector or a qualified notary public, 
showing the payment of the United States inter-
nal revenue special tax for the manufacture or 
sale of alcoholic beverages or products is prima 
facie evidence of the manufacture or sale by the 
party named in the entry within the period set 
forth in the. record. 
(2) (a) In proving the unlawful sale, disposal, gift, 
or purchase, gratuitous or otherwise, or con-
sumption of alcoholic beverages or products, it is 
not necessary that the state or commission estab-
lish that any money or other consideration actu-
ally passed or that an alcoholic beverage or prod-
uct was actually consumed if the court or trier of 
fact is satisfied that a transaction in the nature 
of a sale, disposal, gift, or purchase actually oc-
curred or that any consumption of alcoholic bev-
erages or products was about to occur. 
(b) Proof of consumption or intended consump-
tion of an alcoholic beverage or product on prem-
ises on which consumption is prohibited, by some 
person not authorized to consume alcoholic bev-
erages or products on those premises, is evidence 
that an alcoholic beverage or product was sold or 
given to or purchased by the person consuming, 
about to consume, or carrying away the alcoholic 
beverage or product as against the occupant of 
the premises. 1990 
32A-12-103. Criminal responsibility for conduct 
of another. 
In addition to Title 76, Chapter 2, Part 2 of the 
Utah Criminal Code relating to criminal responsibil-
ity for the conduct of another, the following principles 
apply to violations of this title: 
(1) If a violation of this title is committed by 
any person in the employ of the occupant of any 
premises in which the offense is committed, or by 
any person who is required by the occupant to be 
or remain in or upon the premises, or to act in 
any way for the occupant, the occupant is prima 
facie considered a party to the offense committed, 
and is liable as a principal offender, notwith-
standing the fact that the offense was committed 
by a person who is not proved to have committed 
it under or by the direction of the occupant. Noth-
ing in this section relieves the person actually 
committing the offense from liability. 
(2) If a violation of this title is committed by a 
corporation or association, the officer or agent of 
the corporation or association in charge of the 
premises in which the offense is committed is 
prima facie considered a party to the offense com-
mitted, and is personally liable to the penalties 
prescribed for the offense as a principal offender. 
Nothing in this section relieves the corporation 
or association or the person who actually commit-
ted the offense from liability. 1990 
32A-12-104. Violation of title a misdemeanor. <• 
Any person who violates this title or the commis-
sion rules adopted under this title is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor, unless otherwise provided in this ti-
tle. 1990 
32A-12-105. Addi t ional c r imina l penal t ies . 
In addition to the penalties provided in Title 76, the 
Utah Criminal Code, Chapter 3: 
(1) Upon any defendant's conviction of any of-
fense defined in this title, the court may also or-
der the defendant to make restitution or pay 
costs in accordance with Title 77, the Utah Code 
of Criminal Procedure, Chapter 32a. 
(2) Upon a corporation's or association's con-
viction of any offense defined in this title, and a 
failure of the corporation or association to pay a 
fine imposed upon it, the corporate powers, 
rights, and privileges of the corporation or associ-
ation, if it is a domestic corporation or associa-
tion, may be suspended or revoked, and if a for-
eign corporation, it forfeits its right to do intra-
state business in this state. The department shall 
transmit the name of each corporation or associa-
tion to the Division of Corporations and Commer-
cial Code, which shall immediately record the ac-
tion in a manner that makes the information 
available to the public. The suspension, revoca-
tion, or forfeiture is effective from the time the 
record is made, and the certificate of the Division 
of Corporations and Commercial Code is prima 
facie evidence of the suspension, revocation, or 
forfeiture. Nothing contained in this section may 
be construed as affecting, limiting, or restricting 
any proceedings that otherwise may be taken for 
the imposition of any other punishment or the 
modes of enforcement or recovery of fines or pen-
alties. 
(3) Upon the conviction of any business entity 
required to have a business license to operate its 
business activities, or upon the conviction of any 
of its agents, employees, or officers of any offense 
defined in this title, with the knowledge, consent, 
or acquiescence of the business entity, the de-
partment shall forward a copy of the judgment of 
conviction to the appropriate governmental en-
tity responsible for issuing and revoking the 
business licenses. That governmental entity may 
institute appropriate proceedings to revoke the 
business' license, and upon revocation, a license 
may not be granted to the business entity for at 
least one year from the date of revocation. Upon 
the conviction for a second or other offense, a 
license may not be granted for at least two years 
from the date of revocation. 
(4) Upon conviction of any physician, pharma-
cist, druggist, dentist, or veterinarian of any of-
fense defined in this title, the department shall 
forward a certified copy of the judgment of con-
viction to the Department of Commerce. That de-
partment may institute appropriate proceedings 
to revoke the defendant's license, and upon revo-
cation, a license may not be granted to the defen-
dant by the department for at least one year from 
the date of revocation. Upon the defendant's con-
viction for a second or other offense, a license 
may not be granted for at least two years from 
the date of revocation. 1990 
PART 2 
SALE, PURCHASE, POSSESSION, AND 
CONSUMPTION 
32A-12-201. Unlawful sale or supply. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person, licensee, permit-
\ t ee , or their officers, managers, employees, or agents 
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to keep for sale, or to directly or indirectly or upon 
any pretense or device, sell, offer to sell, or otherwise 
furnish or supply to another, any alcoholic beverage 
0r product, except as provided by this title or the 
rules of the commission adopted under this title. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided, a manufacturer, 
sUpplier, or importer of liquor, wine, and heavy beer 
products, and their employees, agents, and represen-
tatives may not sell, offer to sell, solicit or canvass for 
orders, or otherwise furnish or supply these products 
to another within this state other than the depart-
ment and military installations. 1993 
32A-12-202. Unauthorized sale o r supply . 
A person authorized by this title to sell any alco-
holic beverage or product, and an officer, manager, 
employee, or agent of tha t person may not sell, offer 
to sell, or otherwise furnish or supply, any alcoholic 
beverage or product in any place, or at any day or 
time other than as authorized by this title or the 
rules of the commission. 1990 
32A-12-203. Unlawful sale or supply to minors. 
(1) A person may not sell, offer to sell, or otherwise 
furnish or supply any alcoholic beverage or product to 
any person under the age of 21 years. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (1), 
a person who knowingly sells, offers to sell, or other-
wise furnishes or supplies any alcoholic beverage or 
product to any person under the age of 21 years is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) This section does not apply to the furnishing or 
supplying of an alcoholic beverage or product to a 
minor for medicinal purposes by the parent or guard-
ian of the minor or by the minor's physician or den-
tist, in accordance with this title. 1991 
32A-12-204, Unlawful sale or supply to intoxi-
cated persons. 
A person may not sell, offer to sell, or otherwise 
furnish or supply any alcoholic beverage or product to 
any person who is apparently under the influence of 
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs 
or to a person whom the person furnishing the alco-
holic beverage knew or should have known from the 
circumstances was under the influence of intoxicat-
ing alcoholic beverages or products or drugs. 1990 
32A-12-205. Unlawful sale or supply to inter-
dicted persons. 
( D A person may not sell, offer to sell, or otherwise 
furnish or supply any alcoholic beverage or product to 
any known interdicted person. 
(2) This section does not apply to the furnishing or 
supplying of an alcoholic beverage or product to an 
interdicted person upon the prescription of a physi-
cian, or administered by a physician, dentist, or hos-
pital under this title. 1990 
32A-12-206. Unlawful sale or supply of beer. 
(1) A person may not sell, offer to sell, or otherwise 
furnish or supply beer to the general public in con-
Joiners larger than two liters. This does not preclude 
licensed beer wholesalers from selling, offering to 
***}* or otherwise furnishing or supplying beer in con-
tainers larger than two liters to beer retailers autho-
r i 2 e
" by this title to dispense beer on draft for con-
sumption on the beer retailer's licensed premises. 
v*) A person may not purchase or possess beer in 
containers larger than two liters unless the person is 
*beer retailer authorized by this title to dispense 
? e e r on draft for consumption on the beer retailer's 
wcensed premises. 1991 
32A-12-207. Unlawful sale o r supp ly d u r i n g 
emergency . 
( D A person may not sell, offer to sell, or otherwise 
furnish or supply any alcoholic product in an area 
during a period of emergency proclaimed by the gov-
ernor to exist in the area. 
(2) This section does not apply if, in the judgment 
of the governor, the emergency does not require sus-
pension of sale or supply of alcoholic beverages, and 
the emergency proclamation so provides. 1990 
32A-12-208. Unlawful p u r c h a s e o r a c c e p t a n c e . 
It is unlawful for any person, or the person's officer, 
manager, employee, or agent, directly or indirectly or 
upon any pretense or device, to purchase, take, or 
accept any alcoholic beverage or product from any 
other person, except as provided by this title or the 
rules of the commission adopted under this title. 1990 
32A-12-209. Unlawful p u r c h a s e , possess ion , or 
c o n s u m p t i o n by mino r s . 
(1) It is unlawful for any person under the age of 
21 years to purchase, possess, or consume any alco-
holic beverage or product, unless specifically autho-
rized by this title. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person under the age of 
21 years to misrepresent his age, or for any other 
person to misrepresent the age of a minor, for the 
purpose of purchasing or otherwise obtaining an alco-
holic beverage or product for a minor. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person under the age of 
21 years to possess or consume any alcoholic beverage 
while riding in a limousine or chartered bus. 1992 
32A-12-210. Unlawful p u r c h a s e by in tox ica ted 
p e r s o n s . 
A person may not purchase any alcoholic beverage 
or product when he is under the influence of intoxi-
cating alcoholic beverages, products, or drugs. 1990 
32A-12-211. Unlawful purchase by interdicted 
persons. 
A person may not purchase or possess any alcoholic 
beverage or product if he is an interdicted person, 
except as prescribed or administered by a physician, 
dentist, or hospital under this title. 1990 
32A-12-212. Unlawful possess ion — Excep t ions . 
(1) A person may not have or possess within this 
state any liquor unless authorized by this title or the 
rules of the commission, except that: 
(a) a person who clears United States Customs 
when entering this country may have or possess 
for personal consumption and not for sale or re-
sale, a maximum of one liter of liquor purchased 
from without the United States; or 
(b) a person who moves his residence to this 
state from outside of this state may have or pos-
sess for personal consumption and not for sale or 
resale, any liquor previously purchased outside 
the state and brought into this state during the 
move, if: 
(i) the person first obtains department ap-
proval prior to moving the liquor into the 
state; 
(ii) the department affixes the official 
state label to the liquor; and 
(iii) the person pays the department a rea-
sonable administrative handling fee as de-
termined by the commission. 
(2) Approval under Subsection (l)(b) may be ob-
tained by persons who are either transferring their 
permanent residences to this s tate or who maintain 
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(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer 
and to each party. 
(')) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the re-
t ror review, or within the time period provided 
? a^ncy rule, whichever is longer, any party may 
r\p a response with the person designated by statute 
rule to receive the response. One copy of the re-
oonse shall be sent by mail to each of the parties and 
to the presiding officer. 
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review 
r>f an order by the agency or a superior agency, the 
airency or superior agency shall review the order 
vithin a reasonable time or within the time required 
3y statute or the agency's rules. 
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior 
jgency may by order or rule permit the parties to file 
griefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument. 
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to 
ill parties. 
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of 
any response, other filings, or oral argument, or 
within the time required by statute or applicable 
rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a 
written order on review. 
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the 
agency head or by a person designated by the 
agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to 
each party 
(c) The order on review shall contain: 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule per-
mitting or requiring review; 
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed: 
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues 
reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the 
issues reviewed; 
tv) the reasons for the disposition; 
(vh whether the decision of the presiding 
officer or agency is to be affirmed, reversed, 
or modified, and whether all or any portion 
of the adjudicative proceeding is to be re-
manded; 
Cvii) a notice of any right of further ad-
ministrative reconsideration or judicial re-
view available to aggrieved parties; and 
(viii) the time limits applicable to any ap-
peal or review. i9S8 
63-46b-13. Agency review — Reconsideration. 
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order 
is issued for which review by the agency or by a 
superior agency under Section 63-46b 12 is un-
available, and if the order would otherwise con 
stitute final agency action, any party may file a 
written request for reconsideration with the 
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which 
relief is requested. 
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the 
filing of the request is not a prerequisite for seek-
ing judicial review of the order. 
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed 
with the agency and one copy shall be sent by mail to 
each party by the person making the request. 
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for 
that purpose, shall issue a written order granting 
the request or denying the request. 
(b) If the agency head or the person designated 
for that purpose does not issue an order within 20 
days after the filing of the request, the request 
for reconsideration shall be considered to be de-
nied. 1988 
63-46b-14. Jud ic ia l review — Exhaus t ion of ad-
minis t ra t ive remedies . 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of 
final agency action, except in actions where judicial 
review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after ex-
hausting all administrative remedies available, ex-
cept that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not 
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter 
or any other statute states that exhaustion is not 
required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judi-
cial review of the requirement to exhaust any or 
all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inade-
quate, or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in 
irreparable harm disproportionate to the 
public benefit derived from requiring ex-
haustion. 
(3.i (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial re-
view of final agency action within 30 days after 
the date that the order constituting the final 
agency action is issued or is considered to have 
been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b). 
(b> The petition shall name the agency and all 
other appropriate parties as respondents and 
shall meet the form requirements specified in 
this chapter. I98fl 
63-46b-15. Jud ic i a l review — Informal adjudi-
cat ive p roceed ings . 
< U (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to 
review by trial de novo all final agency actions 
resulting from informal adjudicative proceed-
ings, except that the juvenile court shall have 
jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating 
to removal or placement decisions regarding chil-
dren in state custody. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings shall be as provided in the 
statute governing the agency or, in the absence 
of such a venue provision, in the county where 
the petitioner resides or maintains his principal 
place of business. 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and shall include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the 
party seeking judicial review; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the 
respondent agency; 
(iii) the title and date of the final agency 
action to be reviewed, together with a dupli-
cate copy, summary, or brief description of 
the agency action; 
(iv) identification of the persons who were 
parties in the informal adjudicative proceed-
ings that led to the agency action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from 
the informal proceeding; 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party 
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain 
judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the 
type and extent of relief requested; 
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the 
petitioner is entitled to relief. 
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(bj All additional pleadings and proceedings in 
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jurv, shall de 
termine all questions of fact and lav. and any 
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judi-
cial proceedings under this section 1990 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudica-
t ive proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudica 
tive proceedings 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency ac 
tion resulting from formal adjudicative proceed 
ings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review 
of agency action with the appropriate appellate 
court in the form required by the appellate rules 
of the appropriate appellate court 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
pellate court shall govern all additional filings 
and proceedings in the appellate court 
(3) The contents, transmittal , and filing of the 
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudica 
tive proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record, 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of pre 
paring transcripts and copies for the record 
(I) against a party who unreasonably re-
fuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record, or 
(II) according to any other provision of 
law 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on 
which the agency action is based, is unconstitu-
tional on its face or as applied, 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdic-
tion conferred by any statute, 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution, 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law, 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro-
cedure or decision-making process, or has failed 
to follow prescribed procedure, 
(0 the persons taking the agency action were 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body 
or were subject to disqualification, 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi 
nation of fact, made or implied by the agenc>, 
that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court, 
(h) the agency action is 
(I) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute, 
(II) contrary to a rule of the agency, 
(III) contrary to the agency's prior prac-
tice, unless the agency justifies the inconsis-
tency by giving facts and reasons that dem-
onstrate a fair and rational basis for the in-
consistency, or 
(IV) otherwise arbitrary or capricious 1988 
63-46b-17 J u d i c i a l rev iew — Type of rebef 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjud* 
tive proceedings by the district court or the 
view of formal adjudicative proceedings by an 
pellate court, the court may award damages 
compensation only to the extent expressly auth 
nzed by statute 
(b) In granting relief, the court may 
(I) order agency action required by l a w 
(II) order the agency to exercise its discre-
tion as required by law, 
(III) set aside or modify agency action 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of 
agency action, or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for 
further proceedings 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of 
final agency action are reviewable by a higher court 
if authorized by statute
 1987 
63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other 
temporary remedies pending final dis-
position. 
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the 
agency may grant a stay of its order or other tempo-
rary remedy during the pendency of judicial review, 
according to the agency's rules 
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or 
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary cir-
cumstances require immediate judicial intervention 
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other tem-
porary remedies requested by a party, the agency's 
order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall 
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary 
remedy was not granted 
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other tempo-
rary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or 
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may 
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it 
finds that 
(a) the agency violated its own rules in deny-
ing the stay, or 
(b) (1) the party seeking judicial review is 
likely to prevail on the merits when the 
court finally disposes of the matter, 
(II) the party seeking judicial review will 
suffer irreparable injury without immediate 
relief, 
(III) granting relief to the party seeking 
review will not substantially harm other 
parties to the proceedings, and 
(iv) the threat to the public health, safety, 
or welfare relied upon by the agency is not 
sufficiently serious to justify the agency's ac-
tion under the circumstances 1987 
63-46b 19. Civil enforcement. 
11) la) In addition to other remedies provided by 
law, an agency may seek enforcement of an order 
by seeking civil enforcement in the district 
courts 
(b) The action seeking civil enforcement of an 
agency's order must name, as defendants, each 
alleged violator against whom the agency seeks 
to obtain civil enforcement 
(c) Venue for an action seeking civil enforce-
ment of an agency's order shall be determined by 
the requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure 
(d) The action may request, and the court may 
grant, any of the following 
(1) declaratory relief, 
EXHIBIT "B" 
COMPLAINT FORM 
REPORT OF VIOLATION 
TO: Utah Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control 
P.O. Box 30408 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84130-0408 
FROM: Utah IMarc. & Uquor Law Enforcement 
P.O. Box 18654 
Keams, Utah 84118 
DATE. 12-13-91 
CASE NO. 
SUBJECTS 
5-91-01343-L 
Pop Jenks 
ADDRESS; ' ?ark C i ty 
VIOLATION CODE * 32A-5- i07(9) 
DATE OF ft£KRRAL:_ 
SYNOPSIS OF CASE: ^gent sitter club vit'n no iqmlvirsh^. 
12-23-51 
